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Abstract.  This paper brings forth the contribution of corporate 
governance to risk management system at the enterprise level. The 
research is a complex one, integrating both quantitative and qualitative 
information. The quantitative information consists of balance sheet and 
profit and loss account data while the qualitative one includes dummy 
variables reflecting the agency and monitoring costs which govern the 
relationship between managers and shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial risk management has become more and more important during 
the last fifteen years. Globalization triggered capital market development and 
meanwhile the increase of the volatility which generated a high degree of 
incertitude at the level of the corporate segment.  
Capital structure and financial performance of companies are impacted to 
a high extent by the volatility peculiar to global financial markets, generating 
the development of the financial management which focuses on the main 
variables representing the source of risk – interest rate, foreign exchange, equity 
and commodity. 
Analysts have been preoccupied with identifying potential correlations 
between company’ value and financial management, especially from the 
perspective of scale economies. Implementing financial management 
departments create incentive to economic growth since risk mitigation 
techniques support wealth accumulation. 
This relationship represented the research object of studies concentrated 
especially on non-financial firms since financial institutions imply peculiarities 
in terms of capital structure.  
There are various theories on the contribution of risk management to 
shareholders’ value creation. Nevertheless, imperfections of capital market – 
agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing – 
represent the layer by which company value may increase to the benefit of the 
shareholders.  
Risk management tools represent the support to company’ value 
maximization and it becomes essential in the context of capital market integration. 
Risk increase complemented by risk concentration may confer vulnerability to 
corporate segment. Therefore, risk management strategies contribute in an essential 
manner to value creation.  
2. Database and methodology description 
The case-study is concentrated on two regressions integrating variables 
related to risk management strategies. We consider that leverage and 
profitability are strongly correlated with corporate risk management and we 
propose to underline which are the key variables that impact them. 
The database supporting the case-study includes annual financial data on 
100 US NASDAQ listed companies on ten years (1997-2007).  
The methodology implies Ordinary Least Squares regressions. Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System? 
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The first regression includes Leverage (computed as Debt reported to 
Equity) while the second encompasses Profitability (calculated as Net Profit 
reported to Turnover) as dependent variables.  
The equations can be figured out as: 
 
Yit = α + ß × xit + ωit  
Where 
t = 1….T (time period); 
xit is a vector of explanatory variables; 
α stands for the intercept; 
β stands for volatility indicator; 
ωit stands for the error term. 
 
The independent variables include traditional financial indicators such as 
liquidity, solvency and capital structure related ratios. 
The innovative part of the research consists of the integration of dummy 
variables which reflect corporate management strategies. 
The first equation integrates institutional investors as dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if there are institutional investors among the company’s 
shareholders and the value 0 if among the company’s shareholders there are not 
institutional investors. 
CEO ownership is the second Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
company’s CEO possesses shares and the value 0 if company’s CEO does not 
possess shares. 
The second equation includes blockhoders dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 if the company is held by foreign investors who possess between 
5% and 10% and 0 if the company is not held by such investors  
The second dummy variable includes the acquisition activities which 
takes the value 1 if the company develops acquisition activities and 0 if the 
company does not develop acquisition activities. 
3. Analysis of the statistic results 
In order to get a deeper insight regarding the importance of risk 
management strategies, there have been selected a set of financial indicators 
relative to leverage.  
The perspective is a comparative one; data has been gathered both on US 
companies promoting a high leverage as well as on companies which 
implement more relaxing indebtedness policies.  Petre Brezeanu, Mohammed Subhi Al Essawi, Dorina Poanta, Leonardo Badea 
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I consider a high leverage to equal approximately one third of the total 
assets. Therefore, companies which have a debt to equity ratio close to one third 
of their assets are perceived as promoting an aggressive indebtedness policy. 
In opposition, companies which have a debt to equity ratio inferior to one 
third of the total assets are perceived as promoting a relaxing leverage policy.  
The arbitrage will be the following: 
                 
If 
Leverage = [30%;100%] × Total Assets, then company financing policy is 
associated with aggressive leverage 
 
Leverage = [20%;30%] × Total Assets, then company financing policy is 
associated with medium leverage 
 
Leverage = [0;20%] × Total Assets, then company financing policy is 
associated with low leverage. 
 
Analysts agreed on the fact that leverage is the main variable which 
impacts the risk management strategies system (Lookman, 2003). Therefore, 
leverage multiplier and debt reported to tangible net worth have been selected 
out of the financial indicators reflecting the capital structure/solvency of the 
company. 
The mean and median relative to the Debt reported to Tangible Net Worth 
(DTNW) are superior to the corporations which promote aggressive financial 
leverage (22.6 and 17.48 versus 4.82 and 3.21) in comparison with the median 
and the mean corresponding to the companies adopting low leverage. The 
maximum corresponding to the DTNW relative to companies which adopt 
aggressive leverage is highly superior to the one relative to the companies 
which adopt low leverage (122.69 versus 45.58).  
A higher leverage is equivalent to strong corporate governance 
mechanisms. This conclusion is in line with the assumption made by Cremers 
(2005) according to which companies focused on self-financing do not have 
strong mechanisms specific to corporate governance. 
Statistics corresponding to leverage multiplier follow-up the same 
direction: corresponding mean and median are superior for the companies 
adopting aggressive leverage (5.86 and 4.16 versus 8.91 and 9.32). 
Business is run out mostly by the intermediary of the externally attracted 
funds. Moreover, in order to get more external funds, firms must comply with 
the security/covenant requirement (meaning it has to provide creditors with 
enough collateral proved by a high level of equity). The arbitrage concerning Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System? 
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leverage multiplier is not exceedingly superior as in the case of the debt 
reported to tangible net worth. The standard deviations corresponding to the 
two financial indicators show out a high degree of volatility at the level of the 
Debt reported to Tangible Net Worth specific to the corporations which adopt 
aggressive financial leverage (26.2 versus 8.41) which is in line with the 
assumption that their capital structure is more dynamic.  
Statistic output reveals important findings in terms of corporate 
management strategies.  
A key variable closely related to corporate management strategies is 
represented by growth opportunities. We used research and development 
expenditures (R&D) as well as tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) 
as proxies for growth opportunities. These proxies capture the resources 
invested into growth opportunities and we assume them to be positively 
correlated both with profitability and leverage.  
The statistic output confirms the initial assumption. The coefficients 
corresponding to the two variables are 5% significant, underlining a consistent 
impact on leverage. Thus, 100% variation of R&D and tangible assets triggers 
32.1% and 56.2%, respectively modification of leverage.  
This finding is in line with previous research papers (Lin, Smith, 2007, 
Allayannis, Ofek, 2001, Gay, Nam, 1998, Dolde, 1995).  
Other important variables derives from market information captured by 
earnings-to-price and book-to-market ratio. A lower book-to-market ratio 
reflects strong growth opportunities and a consistent tendency to implement 
corporate management strategies. 
The same correlation can be figured out at the level of the earnings to 
price ratio; low earnings to price reflect strong growth opportunities, which 
validates previous findings (Gay, Nam, 1998, Berkman, Bradbury, 1996).  
The statistic output reveals the negative correlation (see Annex 2). The 
two ratios determine a leverage variation of -0.342 and of -0.123 respectively. 
Operating activities revenues capture growth opportunities. The 
coefficient is positive, indicating a strong contribution of operational revenues 
to growth opportunities.  
As for the second regression, interest coverage ratio and debt ratio 
support corporate management strategies. High growth opportunities and high 
financial leverage contribute positively to profitability and to corporate risk 
management, in line with previous findings (Graham, Rogers, 2002, Geczy et 
al., 1997). Moreover, Lel (2006) pointed out that the positive association 
between corporate risk management strategies and leverage ratios depends on 
corporate governance structures.  Petre Brezeanu, Mohammed Subhi Al Essawi, Dorina Poanta, Leonardo Badea 
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Finance and investing decision processes are strongly related to risk 
management strategies, especially from the perspective of financial resources. 
Investment projects which are not supported by internal funds generate external 
equity or debt. This situation determines additional costs in terms of agency 
conflicts. Creditors expect yields according to the company risk profile, which 
determines the increase of debt cost and the decrease of company value (Myers, 
1993).  
Even from 1986, Asquith and Mullins highlighted that external equity 
triggers a negative impact on firm value since investors associate management 
propensity to issue new stock if the company is overvalued.  
This assumption is validated by the Annex 2. Coefficients relative to 
gross margin (0.216) and to earnings to price ratio (-0.123) are strongly 
significant. Gross margin impacts positively leverage while the influence of 
earnings to price ratio is negative.  
Risk management strategies are related to capital structure. Corporate risk 
management system is built up according to the availability of the firm to 
attract external resources. Tufano (1998) and Chang (2000) highlighted that 
internal financing diminishes the constraints imposed by capital market or 
banking system. Hedging is slightly promoted by firms which adopt pecking 
order behavior in terms of financial structure (Spano, 2001, Moore et al., 2000).  
The correlation between financing and investment process encompasses 
in the context of the mix between firm growth perspectives and capital market/ 
banking system constraints. Previous approaches pointed out that company cash 
flow is slightly impacted by hedging strategies (Gay and Nam, 1998; Guay and 
Kothari, 2003).  
The negative impact of book to market ratio and of earnings to price ratio 
on leverage strongly supports this idea.  
Current liquidity contributes positively to leverage, which underlines the 
idea that liquidity is an important axis of management strategies. Literature 
revealed that it is quite difficult to implement highly worthwhile liquidity 
strategies, since under certain circumstances, a high liquidity ratio is likely to 
determine consistent opportunity costs (Faulkender, 2005). Nevertheless, 
liquidity shortage may generate payment difficulties, which can lead to 
bankruptcy. 
The empirical test highlights that a liquid company is receptive to 
indebtedness, confirming that good liquidity creates incentives to attract 
external financial resources. 
1% variation of size determines a profitability variation of 0.731. Similar 
strong impacts are exerted by tangibility and Z-score (0.892 and 0.618 
respectively). In accordance with Dionne et al. (2003), size contributes Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System? 
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positively to gross margin, confirming the assumption that larger firms have 
higher profit perspectives.  
Tangibility has a positive impact on gross margin. Analysts pointed out 
that a high covenant supports propensity to leverage (Carpenter, 2000), being 
perceived positively by creditors. 
Risk management strategies imply a real challenge from the perspective 
of the agency problems, conflicts of interest and informational assimmetries. 
Ever since 1985, Smith and Stulz revealed that there are different risk 
perceptions from the part of the managers and shareholders. Managers tend to 
implement risk strategies in accordance with their risk preferences which 
frequently are not similar to the ones expressed by shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the control exerted by shareholders on company’s 
management triggers monitoring costs which impact negatively the financial 
performance. Previous approaches pointed out that shareholders’ degree of 
dispersion influences the agency costs. According to the free rider theory, if 
shareholders’ concentration degree is high, then monitoring costs are not likely 
to be afforded (May, 1995). 
Berger and Ofek (1995) revealed that monitoring costs are more likely to 
be supported in case of institutional investors. Myers and Smith (1990) 
highlighted that managers pretend compensation benefits according to the 
assumed risk level. Since risk level increases, the reward the managers ask for 
is higher too.  
Stulz (2001) revealed that corporate hedging strategies impact positively 
company cash-flow, decreasing the idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, shareholders’ 
diversification degree improves the efficiency of business strategies.  
Empirical evidence reveals similar findings. Blockholders dummy 
variable contributes positively to profitability, meaning that a low shareholders’ 
dispersion is favorable to growth perspective. This is in line with the 
assumption that concentration of shareholders implies a high cohesion in terms 
of management strategies, which impacts positively the profitability. 
Institutional investors and CEO ownership have positive impact on 
leverage.  
CEO ownership dummy variable is associated with compensation 
benefits. Leverage becomes the corporate governance device by which 
informational asymmetry degree decreases.  
The positive coefficients associated with dummy variables reveal certain 
opposite results in comparison with previous researches. Since CEO ownership 
is conceived as an incentive to correlate management performance with 
company’s financial results, leverage is not figured out anymore as a corporate Petre Brezeanu, Mohammed Subhi Al Essawi, Dorina Poanta, Leonardo Badea 
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governance mechanism and the expected sign of the coefficient is expected to 
be negative. 
Empirical results are different, revealing a positive contribution of 
dummy variable to leverage; even if managers have benefits proportional with 
their management performance, which are likely to motivate them to ensure 
adequate management strategies and to be to a certain extent reluctant to 
indebtedness (from the perspective of the financial constraints) this does not 
trigger low leverage policy. This can be interpreted as a proof of the fact that 
analyzed companies are receptive to external financing. 
Empirical tests focused on the main variables underlying corporate risk 
strategies imply some limitations.  
We consider that the endogeneity of variables revealing important aspects 
of financing and investment decision is the main problem. To some extent, 
solvency, liquidity and profitability indicators are likely to integrate different 
levels of endogeneity.  
Another challenge is represented by the accounting and the disclosure 
level of financial market information. It is likely that companies financial data 
in terms of capital structure and profitability should not incorporate the over 
time variations that would impact strongly the final empirical results.  
Conclusions 
The research approach analyzes the importance of risk management 
strategies within corporate environment by the intermediary of profitability and 
leverage as eloquent variables.  
The research is a complex one, integrating both quantitative and 
qualitative information. The quantitative information consists of balance sheet 
and profit and loss account data while the qualitative one includes dummy 
variables reflecting the agency and monitoring costs which govern the 
relationship between managers and shareholders. 
  Risk management strategies are related to capital structure. Corporate 
risk management system is built up according to the availability of the firm to 
attract external resources.  
The correlation between financing and investment process encompasses 
in the context of the mix between firm growth perspectives and capital market/ 
banking system constraints. 
Statistic output reveals important findings in terms of corporate 
management strategies.  Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System? 
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The empirical test highlights that a liquid company is receptive to 
indebtedness, confirming that good liquidity creates incentives to attract 
external financial resources. 
1% variation of size determines a profitability variation of 0.731. Similar 
strong impacts are exerted by tangibility and Z-score (0.892 and 0.618 
respectively). In accordance with Dionne et al. (2003), size contributes 
positively to gross margin, confirming the assumption that larger firms have 
higher profit perspectives.  
Tangibility has a positive impact on gross margin. Analysts pointed out 
that a high covenant supports propensity to leverage (Carpenter, 2000), being 
perceived positively by creditors. 
Risk management strategies imply a real challenge from the perspective 
of the agency problems, conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries. 
CEO ownership dummy variable is associated with compensation 
benefits. Leverage becomes the corporate governance device by which 
informational asymmetry degree decreases.  
The positive coefficients associated with dummy variables reveal certain 
opposite results in comparison with previous researches. Since CEO ownership 
is conceived as an incentive to correlate management performance with 
company’s financial results, leverage is not figured out anymore as a corporate 
governance mechanism and the expected sign of the coefficient is expected to 
be negative. 
Empirical results are different, revealing a positive contribution of 
dummy variable to leverage; even if managers have benefits proportional with 
their management performance, which are likely to motivate them to ensure 
adequate management strategies and to be to a certain extent reluctant to 
indebtedness (from the perspective of the financial constraints) this does not 
trigger low leverage policy. This can be interpreted as a proof of the fact that 
analyzed companies are receptive to external financing. 
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Annex 1 
List of variables used in the case study 
 
Indicator Description  Source 
Assets  growth  Assets dynamic computed as the difference 
between the assets level in moment t and 
assets level in moment t-1 
Balance sheet data 
Book-to-market ratio 
 
 
 
Indicator computed as the ratio between book 
value and market value 
Book value = Total assets – Total debt 
Market value = Price per share × Number of 
shares 
Balance sheet and 
market data extracted 
from stock exchange 
reports 
Earnings  to  price  ratio  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
earnings and price 
Data extracted from 
stock exchange reports 
Exploration activities  Revenues from exploration  activities  Profit and loss account 
data 
Market to book leverage     
Tangibility  The weight of tangible assets into total assets  Balance sheet data 
R&D  Research and development expenses  Balance sheet data 
Institutional investors  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there 
are institutional investors among the company’s 
shareholders and the value 0 if among the 
company’s shareholders there are not institutional 
investors 
Data extracted from 
stock exchange reports 
CEO  ownership  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
company’s CEO possesses shares and the value 
0 if company’s CEO does not possess shares 
Data extracted from 
stock exchange reports 
  
Annex 2 
Statistic output relative to the leverage used as dependent variable 
 Coefficient  R-squared/Adjusted  R-squared 
Assets growth  0.564 (4.897) 0.001   
Book-to-market -0.342*  (1.585)  0.093   
Earnings to price ratio  -0.123(0.099) 0.076   
Exploration activities  0.214* (1.379) 0.042   
Market to book leverage  0.672 (0.738) 0.041   
Property, plant and equipment  0.321 (0.055) 0.005   
Research and development  0.562* (2.880) 0.005   
Institutional investors  0.217* (7.154) 0.134   
CEO shareownership  0.156(1.055) 0.896  0.563/0.452 
Source: own calculations. 
*= Significant at 0% **= Significant at 5% ***= Significant at 10% 
-T statistic in brackets and standard errors below Petre Brezeanu, Mohammed Subhi Al Essawi, Dorina Poanta, Leonardo Badea 
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Annex 3 
List of variables used in the second regression 
Indicator Description  Source 
Interest coverage 
ratio 
Indicator computed as the ratio between 
the EBIT and the interest expenses  
Profit and loss account data 
Gross margin  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
gross profit and turnover  
Profit and loss account data 
Debt to equity ratio  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
debt and equity  
Balance sheet data 
Return on assets  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
net profit and total assets 
Profit and loss account data 
Current liquidit  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
current assets and current liabilities 
Balance sheet data 
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets  Balance sheet data 
Blockhoders  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the company is held by foreign investors 
who possess between 5% and 10% and 0 if 
the company is not held by such investors  
Data extracted from stock 
exchange reports 
Z score  Variable computed according to the 
Altman function 
Own calculations  
Acquisition activities  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 
if the company develops acquisition 
activities and 0 if the company does not 
develop acquisition activities  
Data extracted from stock 
exchange reports 
Interest coverage 
ratio 
Indicator computed as the ratio between 
the EBIT and the interest expenses  
Profit and loss account data 
Gross margin  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
gross profit and turnover  
Profit and loss account data 
Debt to equity ratio  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
debt and equity  
Balance sheet data 
Return on assets  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
net profit and total assets 
Profit and loss account data 
Current liquidity  Indicator computed as the ratio between 
current assets and current liabilities 
Balance sheet data 
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets  Balance sheet data 
Blockhoders  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the company is held by foreign investors 
who possess between 5% and 10% and 0 if 
the company is not held by such investors  
Data extracted from stock 
exchange reports 
Z score  Variable computed according to the 
Altman function 
Own calculations  
Acquisition activities  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 
if the company develops acquisition 
activities and 0 if the company does not 
develop acquisition activities  
Data extracted from stock 
exchange reports Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System? 
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Annex 4 
 
Statistic output relative to the second regression,  
implying profitability as dependent variable 
 
 Coefficient  R-squared/Adjusted  R-squared 
Interest coverage ratio  0.452** (2.893) 0.001   
Gross margin  0.216* (8.553) 0.014   
Debt ratio  0.387*** (2.695) 4.384   
Return on assets  0.416** (2.084)  
(0.986) 
 
Current liquidity  0.561(1.297) 
0.0001 
 
Size 0.731(1.509)  0.018   
Tangible assets  0.892(5.074) 
1.524 
 
Z score  0.618** (5.512) 
0.324 
 
Blockholders 0.156**  (-3.139)  0.006   
Acquisition activities  0.134  0.673/0.562 
Source: own calculations. 
 
*= Significant at 0% **= Significant at 5% ***= Significant at 10% 
-T statistic in brackets and standard errors below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Petre Brezeanu, Mohammed Subhi Al Essawi, Dorina Poanta, Leonardo Badea 
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Annex 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics corresponding to the leverage ratios relative to 
companies which adopt an aggressive leverage in comparison with 
companies which adopt a low leverage 
 
  DTNWREL LEVMULTREL  DTNWAGRE LEVMULTAGRE 
 Mean  4.820922  5.586039  22.6  8.919091 
 Median  3.21  4.16  17.48  9.32 
 Maximum  45.58  43.21  122.69  17.18 
 Minimum  -7.24  -6.24  0.49  1.38 
 Std. Dev.  8.41073  7.56561  26.20977  4.193002 
 Skewness  3.977484  3.844596  2.777634  0.084551 
 Kurtosis  19.33426  18.88299  10.93391  3.070775 
 Jarque-Bera  701.4401  661.7099  85.99053  0.030804 
 Probability  0  0  0  0.984716 
 Sum  245.867  284.888  497.2  196.22 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3537.019  2861.923  14426  369.2066 
Source: own calculs. 
DTNWREL = Debt to Tangible Net Worth corresponding to companies which adopt a 
low leverage  
LEVMULTREL = Leverage Multiplier corresponding to companies which adopt a low 
leverage  
DTNWAGRE= Debt to Tangible Net Worth corresponding to companies which adopt an 
aggressive leverage  
LEVMULTAGRE = Leverage Multiplier corresponding to companies which adopt an 
aggressive leverage.s 